


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
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
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28 October 1961

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
### CONTENTS

1. USSR-Berlin: Gromyko uncompromising in talk with Ambassador Thompson. (*Page i*)




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3. USSR-Albania: Khrushchev's renewed attack on Albanian leaders apparently makes break with them irrevocable. (*Page iv*)




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5. Laos: Phoumi again voices opposition to Souvanna as premier. (*Page v*)



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7. South Africa: Recent sabotage incidents apparently organized by underground African groups. (*Page vi*)



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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\*USSR-Berlin: Foreign Minister Gromyko's uncompromising stand in his talk with Ambassador Thompson on 27 October suggests that the USSR considers its prestige has been challenged by recent events in Berlin. Gromyko read a formal protest which warned that if American actions continue, "they will be regarded as an act of provocative armed invasion of GDR territory, and the German Democratic Republic will be given necessary support for purposes of ending such actions." During the ensuing conversation with the Ambassador, Gromyko made no effort to respond to suggestions that the discussions on the issue could continue in Moscow or Berlin. The Soviet protest also went beyond the current issue of identification documents for US personnel in civilian clothes to assert in effect that East German police have the authority to permit or deny all passage across the sector border. Ambassador Thompson's preliminary conclusion is that the USSR considers it has a good issue and will be prepared to use force. *ND*

Despite the tense situation in Berlin, Khrushchev in his 27 October speech at the party congress made a point of reiterating his previous statement withdrawing a deadline for a German treaty and urging a "businesslike and fair solution of the problem." He also endorsed further US-Soviet exploratory talks in order "to prepare fruitful negotiations" although he coupled this with a warning against use of talks merely to delay a settlement. He concluded his remarks on Germany and Berlin by stating: "Such is our stand, we have adhered to it so far, and we abide by it firmly." According to a TASS summary Khrushchev did not touch directly on the current events in Berlin. He claimed that the West wanted the USSR to act as "traffic police" in Berlin but that the Soviet Union could not be forced to

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act against its "vital interests." He also emphasized that it was "high time" the West realized that it could not negotiate with the Soviet Union on the basis of "positions of strength."

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\*Albania: Khrushchev's attack on Albania in his 27 October speech makes the break between the Soviet party and the present Albanian leaders irrevocable and probably fore-shadows more formal action to sever Albanian ties with the Communist world. His characterization of the Albanian leaders as "enemies of communism" and his appeal over the heads of these leaders to the Albanian people is reminiscent of Stalin's approach at the time of the break between the USSR and Yugoslavia. In his choice of accusations to hurl at the Albanians--including that of "hopeless dogmatists"--Khrushchev went further than he had in his first speech to the congress in extending the attack on Albania to the Chinese, without actually naming them. Answering Chou En-lai's rebuke of his earlier remarks, Khrushchev noted with heavy sarcasm that the USSR "shared the anxiety of our Chinese friends" for bloc unity and pointedly asserted that "there is hardly anyone who can contribute to the solution of this problem more than the Communist party of China." [REDACTED]

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Laos: Ambassador Harriman, commenting that an internal settlement in Laos is a prerequisite to an international agreement at the Geneva conference, scores General Phoumi's resurgent opposition to Souvanna Phouma following earlier agreement at Hin Heup on Souvanna as head of a coalition government. Phoumi, in conversations with Western diplomats and correspondents, is again voicing doubt as to the wisdom of seeking a "Souvanna solution" on the ground that this would lead to a Communist take-over. Phoumi apparently intends to give lip service to the goal of forming a coalition government while placing all possible roadblocks to its actual attainment. This strategy risks driving Souvanna closer to the Communists. Souvanna, who is back in Xieng Khouang after his 18 October meeting with King Savang in Luang Prabang, has issued conciliatory appeals for cooperation by all factions, but reportedly is annoyed by Boun Oum's refusal to attend a "final"

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
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three princes' meeting at the Plaine des Jarres to decide on  
the composition of the cabinet.

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South Africa: Sabotage, apparently organized by underground African groups, broke out last month and early this month in the area around Johannesburg. The American Embassy in Pretoria reports that the incidents, which included the cutting of power and communications lines and the burning of a local government office dealing with African affairs, showed considerable advance planning. The embassy comments that the inability of the Africans to carry on an overt political campaign in the face of strong security measures made the turn to sabotage inevitable. Although there have been no incidents since early October, the embassy believes that sabotage and underground activities are likely to increase in the future.

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## 22nd Party Congress

Khrushchev has continued to develop the attack against the anti-party group at the 22nd party congress in order (1) to indict the Albanian and by implication the Chinese leadership for the same heresies; (2) to define clearly the advantages of Khrushchev's leadership over Stalin's; and (3) to establish further Khrushchev's supreme position in the Communist hierarchy.

In addition to the accusation that it failed to oppose "de-Stalinization," the anti-party group is charged with incorrect assessment of the international scene. The cited examples of the group's incorrect views bear a striking resemblance to the positions held by Chinese and Albanian leaders. Specific condemnations of former Foreign Minister Molotov's position on the inevitability of war and his militant interpretation of peaceful coexistence, for example, closely parallel charges which Moscow leveled at the Chinese at the height of the Sino-Soviet controversy in 1960.

Speakers at the congress have also found attacks on the anti-party group a convenient medium for tribute to Khrushchev as the man who "saved" the Soviet people from a return to Stalinism. Increasingly severe denunciations of the group are obviously intended to sharpen the contrast between Stalinist rule and the "Leninist" brand of communism practiced by Khrushchev. Propaganda chief Leonid Ilichev's warning against confusing the personality cult with the "authority of present leaders," and state security chief Shelepin's assurances that the secret police excesses of Stalin's day could never recur, are designed to emphasize that the build-up of Khrushchev should not be interpreted as a new "cult of personality."

The continuing adulation of Khrushchev underscores his evidently unassailable authority in the Soviet hierarchy. Virtually all speakers at the congress have contributed to a burgeoning "cult of Khrushchev" with fulsome praise which is clearly

intended to bolster still further the image of the Soviet party boss as the legitimate successor to Lenin.

While most speakers have concentrated on describing Khrushchev as the chief architect of Soviet communism, Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky referred to him as "our supreme commander-in-chief," an appellation no Soviet leader has enjoyed since Stalin assumed the title of Generalissimo in the early days of World War II.

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
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


## Sabotage in South Africa

According to reports reaching the American Embassy in Pretoria, the sabotage incidents--some of which showed considerable skill--were accompanied by telephone calls to Johannesburg newspapers, calling the newspapers' attention to the occurrences. One caller said he spoke for a "National Liberation Committee," an underground organization which, according to South African political exiles, has branches in the important South African cities.

25X1  Following the abortive general strike last May, leaders of the outlawed African National Congress (ANC) reportedly decided to enter a "second phase" of anti-government activity, in which the emphasis would be on sabotage. ANC activists allegedly were to be sent abroad for training, and a secret group independent of the ANC and its associated organization was to be set up to oversee the sabotage activity. The efforts of the saboteurs were to be concentrated on power stations, communications networks, and offices of the government's Bantu Administration Department. These plans are said to have the enthusiastic approval of ANC leader Albert Luthuli, who warned only that no "unnecessary deaths" should result.

25X1 Nelson Mandela, who led the strike campaign in May, reportedly stated in mid-September that an ANC sabotage campaign would begin in the near future. Mandela said that the campaign would concentrate initially on telephone lines and government offices but later might include roadblocks and railroad sabotage.



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